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Uncertainty is an obstacle for commitments under cap and trade schemes.  We assess how 
well intensity targets, where countries' permit allocations are indexed to future realised 
GDP, can cope with uncertainties in international greenhouse emissions trading.  We 
present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the 
optimal degree of indexation to GDP.  Using an 18-region simulation model of a 
cooperative, global cap-and-trade treaty in 2020 under multiple uncertainties and 
endogenous commitments, we show that optimal intensity targets could reduce the cost of 
uncertainty and achieve significant increases in global abatement. The optimal degree of 
indexation to GDP would vary greatly between countries, including super-indexation in 
some advanced countries, and partial indexation for most developing countries.  Standard 
intensity targets (with one-to-one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but 
to a lesser degree and not in all individual cases. Although target indexation is no magic 
wand for a future global climate treaty, gains from reduced cost uncertainty and the 
potential for more stringent environmental commitments might justify the increased 
complexity and other potential downsides of intensity targets.  
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Uncertainty can be a major impediment for cap-and-trade schemes for emission 
permits, be they greenhouse gases or other pollutants.  Setting fixed emission caps or 
targets can give greater certainty about future emission levels and perhaps 
environmental impacts, but in so doing it creates uncertainties about costs of complying 
with the commitments.  Economic uncertainty is often a rallying point for opposition 
against environmental policy, whether implemented by regulation or by market 
mechanisms.  Where compliance costs are uncertain, environmental commitments tend 
to be watered down.  Where those regulated have a strong degree of sovereignty, as in 
international negotiations, uncertainty can even preclude an agreement altogether. 
International climate negotiations are a case in point.  After the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed in 1997, debate raged over how much the Kyoto commitments would cost 
(Toman 2004).  Estimates diverged widely (Weyant 1999), and the fact that meeting the 
Protocol’s fixed quantity targets might have led to comparatively high costs, even under 
international emissions trading, contributed to the United States pulling out of the 
agreement.  Bringing developing countries on board, essential for a meaningful post-
Kyoto treaty, brings even greater challenges from economic uncertainty.  Poor 
countries’ decision-makers can ill afford to sign a treaty that risks major cost blow-outs 
or ‘stifling development’.  And although it is well established in theory that price 
control (i.e. a tax) is preferable to quantity control (i.e. cap-and-trade) under cost 
uncertainty and for pollutants with a flat marginal damage function, such as greenhouse 
gases (Weitzman 1974, Pizer 2002), cap-and-trade is fast becoming the dominant 
instrument for national and international greenhouse gas control.  The European CO2 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the largest commitment to this instrument so far, 
and a number of US States are considering their own cap-and-trade systems.  
It is therefore of key relevance to climate policy to ask: can cap-and-trade schemes 
be better designed to reduce uncertainty?  If so, environmental agreements can become 
both more achievable and more effective, by including targets which are more stringent 
overall, even if not at every place and time.  Of several design features proposed to 
reduce uncertainty, perhaps the most widely discussed, and the one we study here, is 
making emission targets more flexible by indexing target allocations to GDP.  They 
then become targets for the emissions/GDP ratio, that is, emissions intensity targets 
(also referred to as 'relative', 'rate-based', or 'dynamic' targets), designed to compensate 
for fluctuations in emissions caused by fluctuations in economic activity. 
Target indexation has been proposed as a way for making it easier for developing 
countries to commit to greenhouse targets, and featured in Argentina's greenhouse target 2 
proposed in the aftermath of the Kyoto negotiations. The Bush administration, after 
rejecting the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, set a target for future carbon intensity of the US 
economy. Even though this target is close to business-as-usual and therefore has little 
meaning in practical terms, it sparked renewed interest in the concept of intensity 
targets, and also brought a greater political dimension to what is essentially a technical 
issue of mechanism design.  However, intensity targets have been criticised for 
increasing uncertainty in year-by-year emission levels under a treaty, possibly 
weakening environmental commitments, and for bringing greater complexity.
2  
Here we use a single-period, stochastic, globally integrated, though mainly partial 
equilibrium, model of emissions trading with flexible targets under uncertainty, named 
MAGES (Mechanisms for Abating Global Emissions under Stochasticity), to extend the 
analysis of greenhouse intensity targets under uncertainty significantly beyond that in 
the literature so far.  Crucially, this is a multi-country, empirical model, which 
automatically transmits uncertainty between countries via the global permit price; and it 
allows expected target levels to be endogenous, that is to fall (become more stringent) in 
response to the lower cost of uncertainty that intensity targets deliver for risk-averse 
countries.
 3  This is in contrast to existing analytic contributions by Sue Wing et al. 
(2006), Quirion (2005) and Kolstad (2005), all of which considered single countries 
with fixed (exogenous) expected target levels. Our model also allows general intensity 
targets, defined by a continuous degree of indexation to GDP, and thus allows a 
distinction between standard intensity targets, with one-to-one indexation, and optimal 
intensity targets, where a partial degree of indexation is individually chosen to minimise 
a country's cost of uncertainty.  Partial indexation has been considered by Sue Wing et 
al. (2006) and earlier in a foundation, less analytic paper (Ellerman and Sue Wing 
2003), but here in a multi-country model it yields initially surprising recommendations 
for the degrees of indexation that different types of countries should use. 
  
In Section 2 we discuss the empirical underpinnings of intensity targets, give our 
formal definition of general intensity targets under uncertainty, and derive our rule for 
optimal indexation.  Section 3 describes the MAGES permit trading model under 
uncertainty and risk aversion, and its calibration as an 18-country (or region) model of a 
cooperative (non-free-riding) post-Kyoto treaty for all countries and most greenhouse 
                                                             
2 On proposals for intensity targets as a way to draw developing countries into a climate agreement, see 
Baumert et al. 1999, Frankel 1999, Lutter 2000, Philibert and Pershing 2001; on the Argentine target, see 
Bouille and Girardin 2002, Barros and Conte Grand 2002; on the Bush 'target', see for example van 
Vuuren et al. 2002, Blanchard and Perkaus 2004; and on criticism of target indexation, Dudek and Golub 
2003, Müller and Müller-Fürstenberger 2003. 
3 A parallel paper, Pezzey and Jotzo (2006), investigates theoretical properties of the MAGES model 
under risk neutrality. 3 
gas emissions in 2020.  Simulation results and sensitivity analysis are presented in 
Section 4, for scenarios with absolute, standard intensity (one-to-one indexation) and 
optimal intensity targets.  Section 5 discusses issues of framing, potential drawbacks and 
practical applicability of intensity targets, and here we especially address the criticism that 
intensity targets increase emissions uncertainty and thereby undermine environmental 
integrity.  Section 6 concludes. 4 
2.  Formulation of intensity targets 
After discussing the empirical background for intensity targets, here we analyse future 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions as a function of three separate uncertainties.
 4 This is 
complemented by a generalized formulation of emission targets indexed continuously to 
GDP. We then derive a simple rule for optimal indexation of targets, and show the conditions 
for a 'standard' intensity target with one-to-one indexation to reduce net emissions 
uncertainty compared to an absolute target. 
2.1 Empirical  background   
The concept of intensity targets as a means to reduce uncertainty rests on the 
assumption that GDP and emissions move together. To this end, we are interested in the 
co-movement of fluctuations in emissions and fluctuations in GDP – what happens to 
emissions when the economy grows at below or above average rates.
5    
Several studies have examined the GDP-emissions relationship empirically in the 
context of intensity targets, using various methods including statistical forecasting 
models applied to historical data and analysis of past published emissions forecasts 
(Lutter 2000, Sue Wing et al. 2006, Philibert 2004), analysis of co-movement of series 
over time (Höhne and Harnisch 2002), and country case studies (Kim and Baumert 
2002, Bouille and Girardin 2002). Each of these studies confirms that emissions tend to 
fluctuate to some degree with fluctuations in GDP, though the nature and degree of 
linkage estimated varies.  
Our own empirical work (Jotzo 2006a) shows a significant positive correlation 
between deviations of GDP from trend and deviations of emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion from trend, for 23 out of the 30 largest emitting countries over the period 
1971–2000. The strength of the correlation varies greatly between countries, with a 
mean and median around one. Thus in most countries, emissions on average move in 
tandem with GDP, but with large divergences from the mean in individual episodes due 
to changes in emissions intensity. No such correlation is evident between GDP and non-
CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, and between GDP and emissions from land-use change. 
Intensity targets will be able to deal only with GDP-related uncertainty, not 
uncertainty about future emissions intensity, or uncertainty in parts of the economy 
                                                             
4 Throughout, we treat ‘uncertainty’ as the same, quantifiable concept as ‘risk’, rather than Knightian 
(unquantifiable) uncertainty. 
5 This question is quite distinct from the long-term structural relationship between economic growth and 
greenhouse emissions that is the subject of most of the ample literature on the relationship between GDP 
and emissions (such as Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995, Schmalensee et al. 1998). 5 
where emissions are independent of GDP.
 For the calibration of the simulation model 
described below, we need empirical estimates of the magnitude of these uncertainties. 
Results from statistical forecasting models applied to historical data (again see Jotzo 
2006a) indicate that uncertainty about future GDP is sizeable, but significantly smaller 
than uncertainty about emissions intensity. Uncertainty is greater in non-OECD than in 
OECD countries; and uncertainty about non-energy sector emissions is of a similar 
broad magnitude as that for emissions intensity from fuel combustion. We will assume 
that realizations of random variables are independent of each other, and in particular 
that deviations of emissions intensities in the energy sector from their expectations are 
independent of GDP deviations. This independence assumption is supported by results 
from the statistical analysis. Table A1 in the Appendix gives our projections for 2020, 
including the estimated standard deviations, which are used as parameter values in the 
MAGES model. 
2.2  Future emissions and uncertainties  
We assume that emissions in one part of the economy are linked with GDP, though the 
link is not perfect because emissions intensity also fluctuates. Aggregate uncertainty about 
future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the model stems from three separate sources. 
They are: 
-  uncertain output, measured by GDP and denoted  i Y
~
 $/yr, where i denotes one of the 
many countries or regions into which the world is divided (18 of them in our 
empirical model), and $ means constant 2000 US dollars); 
-  uncertain emissions intensity of output in the 'linked' part of the economy, denoted 
i η ~   t/$, where t means a tonne of CO2-equivalent emissions; and 
-  uncertainty in other, not GDP-linked emissions. 
Future BAU emissions in a particular random realization are thus equal to expected BAU 
emissions times adjustments for expectation errors for GDP, emissions intensity and 
emissions in the non-linked sector.  
Formally, realized BAU emissions for country i are 
] ) 1 ( ) ( 1 [
~




i E E ρ η ε α ε ε α − + + + =                 [2.1] 




   Actual BAU emissions in a particular random realization (in t/yr) 
Ei
b  Expected  BAU  emissions 
αi    Fixed share of the economy where emissions are linked with GDP (0 ≤ αi ≤ 1) 6 
εYi   Proportional deviation ('error') of actual GDP  i Y
~
 from its expectation Yi 
εηi   Proportional deviation of actual emissions intensity 
i η ~  in the 'linked' sector 
from its expectation ηi
. 
ερi  Proportional deviation of actual emissions from expectations in the 'non-
linked' sector. 
As introduced above and throughout this paper, a tilde (~) superscript denotes a particular 
realization of a random variable, whereas no superscript denotes its expectation of a random 
variable.  And the disappearance of subscript i or k denotes summing over all countries: ΣiJi 
= ΣkJk =: J, for any variable or parameter J. 
Error terms εYi and εηi are assumed to be additive rather than multiplicative, to keep the 
stochastic analysis tractable. We assume that the error terms are distributed normally and are 
independent of each other, with 
εYi ~ N(0,σYi),  εηi ~ N(0,σηi),  and ερi ~ N(0,σ ρi) .         [2.2]
6,7 
So GDP uncertainty εYi affects emissions in the αi proportion of the economy, but structural 
shifts and other random influences (εηi) also play a role here; while in the other, (1-αi) 
proportion, emissions are independent of GDP and subject  to random shocks ερi.  
The σi parameters are measures of the degree of uncertainty. Numerical calibration is 
done based on the empirical estimates described in Section 2.1 above (see also Appendix). 
Again following empirical findings, we assume that the share αi of emissions linked with 
GDP in each region is equal to the share of the energy sector in total emissions. This 
assumption would obviously need to be refined for detailed country-level analyses, which 
ideally would rely on more disaggregated data.  
Expected BAU emissions Ei
b, GDP Yi and population Li are calibrated on the basis of 
levels reported for the years 2002/2000, and forecasts by the main forecasting agencies. The 
Appendix gives sources and shows all parameter values used. 
2.3  Emissions targets  
Next, we define a general flexible target (or permit allocation), defined as a ratio of 
expected future BAU emissions and adjusted for realized GDP, as  
                                                             
6 In the numerical simulations, these error terms (as well as the error term εCi introduced below) are 
truncated at two standard deviations above and below zero. This is done in order to exclude unrealistic 
realisations at the extreme tails of the probability distributions.  
7 In practice, these deviations from expectations will of course not always be uncorrelated. However, our 









   realised target (in t/year) 
xi    target as a proportion (> 0, perhaps > 1) of expected future BAU emissions 
βi   degree of indexation of the target to GDP (≥ 0) 
and 
b
i E  and εYi  are as defined above.  
By how much the realised target gets adjusted for a deviation in GDP from its expected value 
depends on βi, its degree of indexation. Two obvious special cases are 
Absolute target, with no indexation (βi = 0), hence  
b
i i i i E x X X = =
~
 ;              [2.4] 




i i i E x X ε + = .  [2.5] 
So in our terminology, Kyoto Protocol targets are absolute; and what the literature usually 
refers to as 'intensity targets' are standard intensity targets. Partial indexation is possible and 
is discussed below. Importantly, with no GDP uncertainty, absolute and intensity targets are 
the same because they use the same xi.   
2.4 Optimal  intensity  targets 
Since the error term εYi appears in both realised BAU emissions and intensity targets, 
target indexation changes the variability of the effort implied by the target (the difference 
between BAU emissions and the target): 
E ~b
i – X ~
i =  E
b
i – Xi + N ~
Ei,  hence  E ~b – X ~ = E
b – X + N ~
E  ,              [2.6] 
where from [2.1] and [2.3], a country's net emissions uncertainty (net of any neutralising 
effect of the index βi) is  
N ~
Ei := [(αi – βixi)εYi + αiεηi + (1– αi)ερi] E
b
i .                    [2.7] 
The expectation of squared net emissions uncertainty, from [2.7] and [2.2], is also important: 
DEi := E[N ~
Ei









2  .              [2.8] 
Under the modelling assumptions set out in the next Section, particularly the assumptions 
that all countries take the global permit price as given, the expected global net benefit of the 
treaty is maximised when squared net emissions uncertainty DEi is minimised for all 
countries.
8  This occurs when GDP-related uncertainty σYi is fully neutralised as regards the 
                                                             
8 This is shown formally in Pezzey and Jotzo (2006).  We thank a referee for pointing out that under 
different market assumptions or net benefit functions, net benefit might not be maximised by minimising 
all DEi's. 8 
effort required to meet the target, which is achieved by setting βi such that all  0 = − i i i x β α . 
This in turn leads to our rule for optimal indexation of intensity targets: 
Optimal indexation of emissions targets to GDP means  
i i i x /
* α β =  for all i.              [ 2 . 9 ]  
Thus, the optimal degree of indexation depends on αi, the share of total emissions linked with 
GDP, divided by xi, the relative stringency of the target commitment.  Together with [2.3], 
this defines an 




i i i x E x X ε α + =  .      [2.10] 
For some countries, the share of emissions linked with GDP αi may be greater than the 
target expressed as a share of BAU emissions, xi. That is, an optimal intensity target may be 
super-indexed to GDP ( 1
* > i β ), a possibility which will be realised for several countries in 
our empirical analysis. 
Our finding that not just the degree of GDP-emissions linkage, but also the stringency of 
the target matters for the optimal degree of indexation, is in contrast to most earlier analyses 
on intensity targets which looked only at the emissions-GDP correlation, though it tallies 
with recent work by other authors. In a rather different analytical framework, Sue Wing et al. 
(2006, p.12) found that to reduce variability in abatement burden in an economy with steady 
economic growth, “… stringent emission targets should be implemented using intensity 
limits, while lax targets should employ absolute limits.”  
2.5  Does GDP indexation reduce uncertainty? 
From [2.8], target indexation reduces uncertainty DEi if  
2 2 ) ( i i i i x α β α < −          [ 2 . 1 1 ] .  
So from [2.9], optimal intensity targets are always expected to reduce uncertainty (unless αi 
= 0 when optimal intensity and absolute targets coincide). 
The impact of standard intensity targets by contrast is ambiguous, because they 
undercompensate for GDP-related fluctuations in emissions in cases where βi
* > 1, and 
overcompensate where βi
* < 1. However, with βi = 1, [2.11] holds whenever 
i i x α 2 ) 0 ( < < ,         [ 2 . 1 2 ]  
so standard intensity targets are expected to reduce uncertainty unless αi, the degree of GDP-
emissions linkage, is very small compared to xi, the stringency of the target. 9 
3.  The MAGES model for emissions trading under uncertainty 
To simulate the performance of intensity targets, we use the MAGES (Mechanisms for 
Abating Global Emissions under Stochasticity) model, a new static, stochastic, mainly partial 
equilibrium model of global emissions trading under uncertainty, calibrated for a global, 
post-Kyoto climate treaty, covering all greenhouse gases and taking effect in a single future 
time period, chosen here as the year 2020.  We have chosen to divide the world into 18 
regions or countries, hereafter just 'countries'.  5 are high-income countries known together 
as 'the North', while 13 are low-income ones ('South').   Our choice both represents the main 
players in global climate policy as single countries (such as the USA, EU, China and India), 
and allows detailed analysis for selected developing countries like Argentina and South 
Korea.  The empirical calibration reflects key features of individual countries, while not 
aiming at ‘exact’ numerical representation. For a list of the 18 countries and their empirical 
calibration in MAGES, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3.1  Abatement costs and benefits, and permit trading 
The abatement treaty grants a flexible permit allocation {X ~
i}, comprising an (Xi, βi) pair 
for each country, defining their X ~
i as in [2.3].  Perfect enforcement in the global permit 
market makes abated emissions equal the target only globally: 
 E ~ = X ~,  hence global abatement Q ~ = E ~b – X ~.     [3.1] 
The market price of a permit is p ~, assumed to be taken as given by all countries, and a 
country's emissions trading revenue is then 
R ~
i := p ~[X ~
i  – E ~b
i + Q ~
i(p ~)],  with global R ~ ≡ 0  automatically.      [3.2] 
 




i     := B ~
i – C ~
i  $/yr, where            [3.3]
10 
 B ~
i(Q ~)   :=  ViQ ~ – ½Wi(Q ~)
2 + R ~
i,  Vi  $/t > 0,  Wi  $.yr/t
2 > 0,    [3.4] 
                                                             
9 By comparing emissions trading with no abatement anywhere, rather than with no abatement by i while 
all other countries abate according to the treaty, we are setting aside the problem of free riding; see also 
3.3 below. 
10 In a second-best world, this simple net benefit formula should be amended to allow for the marginal cost 
of public funds being greater than unity (Quirion 2004).  Like several other features such as information and 
enforcement costs, this remains for further work, but it will in any case have little effect on the relative 
performance of absolute, standard intensity and optimal intensity targets as reported here.  
 10 
is i's dollar-valued (gross) benefit B ~
i of global abatement Q ~, including its emissions trading 
revenue. We include valuation of (or benefits from) global abatement in order to be able to 
determine the optimal level of abatement, in the broad vein of Nordhaus (1991).  Abatement 
benefits allow us to model how the reduced uncertainty cost from using a potentially better 
type of target mechanism (such as intensity targets) would be spent endogenously on 
achieving lower target levels, which in turn means greater welfare.   This "endogenous 
targets" effect is a key contribution here, and we discuss it, and the calibration of the benefit 
parameters {Vi} and {Wi}, further in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. 
The cost of i's own abatement Q ~
i is  
 C ~
i(Q ~
i) :=  ½Q ~
i
2/Mi + Q ~
iεCi 
   =  ½Q ~
i
2/Mi + Q ~
iN ~
Ci/Mi,  with  N ~
Ci := MiεCi  .     [3.5] 
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is then linear in Q ~
i, and uncertain: 
 C ~
i′(Q ~
i) =  Q ~
i/Mi + εCi,          [ 3 . 6 ]  
Here εCi is Weitzman's (1974) 'pure unbiased [stochastic] shift' in the MAC. We assume 
E[εCi] = 0, E[εCi
2] =: σCi
2, and εCi is independent of all other uncertainties.
11  Hence from 
[3.3], [3.4] and [3.5], realised net benefit is 
 A ~
i = ViQ ~ – ½Wi(Q ~)
2 – ½Q ~
i
2/Mi – Q ~
iN ~
Ci/Mi + R ~
i.     [3.7] 
A similar formula applies to the Unilateral case, denoted by the superscript 
U. Under 
unilateralism, each country decides on its own abatement effort Q ~U
i in isolation (i.e. 
assuming ∂Q ~U /∂Q ~U
i = 1) and there is no trading revenue: 
 A ~U
i := ViQ ~U – ½Wi(Q ~U)
2 – ½(Q ~U
i)
2/Mi – Q ~ U
iN ~
Ci/Mi.    [3.8] 
We do not model uncertainties in the benefits from global abatement, as under our 
independence assumptions, they would not affect the comparison of expected net benefit 
across mechanisms (though could perhaps have a minor effect on expected payoff, defined 
below).  Stavins (1996), using a neglected result in Weitzman, noted that this convenient 
result does not hold if benefit and cost uncertainties are correlated. However, there is no 
evidence for such correlation in the greenhouse case, or reason to suspect its existence. 
The abatement potentials {Mi} in [3.5] are calibrated with reference to other studies, and 
the degree of uncertainty about abatement costs {σCi} can be gleaned by comparing MAC 
estimates from different models, indicating substantial uncertainty about abatement 
                                                             
11  In practice, deviations in abatement costs from their expectations may well be correlated to a degree with 
deviations from expected emissions intensity. Nevertheless, a large share of MAC uncertainty would stem 
from not knowing in advance the aggregate responsiveness of greenhouse gas emitters to price signals, 
independent of future emissions levels and intensity.  11 
opportunities and costs (see Appendix).  Calibration of the benefit parameters {Vi} and {Wi} 
in [3.4] is discussed in Section 3.4 below. 
To maximise its financial benefit from emissions trading, each country chooses 
abatement Q ~
i to equate its MAC C ~
i′ in [3.6] to the permit price p ~, which gives 
 Q ~
i =  p ~Mi – N ~
Ci,  and hence from [3.1] and [2.6]        [3.9] 
 p ~ =  (E
b–X+N ~
E+N ~
C)/M,  with expectation        [3.10] 
 p  =  (E
b–X)/M.          [ 3 . 1 1 ]  
[3.10] clarifies an important reason for choosing a multi-country model.  It is not just 
each country's own uncertainty that affects its position under emissions trading, but 
uncertainty in all other participating countries as well, transmitted through the realised permit 
price p ~.  How much this deviates from its expectation p depends on deviations from 
expectations N ~
E in BAU emissions and N ~
C in MACs in all countries.  So a flexible target 
that neutralises some uncertainty in one country has flow-through effects for all others in the 
permit market. 
3.2  Payoff and risk aversion 
We assume that country i assesses the desirability of a move from unilateral to treaty 
abatement by calculating its expected payoff from the move, which is best viewed as 
comprising three steps.  
First, i's realised gain from the move is defined from [3.7] and [3.8] as the difference in 
realised net benefits between the treaty and unilateral outcomes: 
   G ~
i := A ~
i –  A ~U
i  .        [ 3 . 1 2 ]  
Then its realised payoff from the move is a risk-adjusted, strictly concave function of gain:  
   U ~
i := G ~
i + zi(1-e–rG ~
i)  $/yr;       zi  $/yr > 0 ,     r yr/$ > 0.    [3.13] 
This captures i's aversion to risk, by weighting potential losses more heavily than potential 
gains, in line with what we perceive to be the political psychology of international treaties. 
Risk aversion is a prerequisite for modeling endogenous targets. Without risk aversion, the 
overall target X is almost completely independent of the type of mechanism, and almost the 
only advantage of intensity targets is in reaching a given target at lower expected cost.
12 
                                                             
12 With absolute and optimal intensity targets, the (αi -βi xi) terms in [2.8] all become αi or 0; and this 
means that without risk aversion (where r = 0 so U = G), our maximising criterion [3.15] below results in 
the same expected global target, X.  With standard intensity targets, the (αi -βi xi) terms are all αi - xi; but 
for our calibration at least, this means that maximising G gives an X only very slightly (well under 1%) 
different from the X found for absolute and optimal intensity targets. 12 
Finally, country i's expected payoff is then, since all the errors have normal distributions with 
zero means, 
   U i := ∫R
4n [G ~






     /   ( 2 π)
2nΠ (σYiσηiσρiσCi)] dε,  with 
               ε := (εYi,…εYn, εηi,…εηn, ερi,…ερn, εCi,…εCn).      [3.14] 
This will be less than expected gain Gi, by virtue of the positive parameters zi and r.  
Importantly, the characterisation in [3.12]-[3.14] assumes that the payoff a country perceives 
is framed solely in terms of the financial and environmental consequences of the treaty, not 
the economy overall.  We discuss this framing effect further in Section 5.1. 
Expectation results, including expected payoff, are computed numerically by Monte 
Carlo simulations in a multi-stage algorithm. The model is solved for a large number of 
random realizations (here 10,000), with joint draws for each of the 18 x 4 = 72 
stochastic parameters, and expectations computed as means over these realisations. In 
each simulation run, this is done for a given target vector {xi}. In iterative re-runs of the 
simulation, the distribution of targets {xi} between countries is then adjusted to fulfill an 
equity constraint which we will discuss next; and finally the overall target X is adjusted 
to find the level of stringency at which global expected payoff is maximized, again 
finding {xi} that fulfills the equity constraint. In simulations with optimal intensity 
targets, we jointly optimise targets {xi} and indexation {βi}. 
3.3  Optimality, the equity criterion, and endogenous targets 
For the case of a global climate treaty analysed here, the MAGES model is solved 
numerically as a cooperative game, by selecting both the overall size X and distribution {xi} 
of expected targets, so that 
–   expected global payoff U is maximised as just noted, subject to:        [3.15] 
–   an equity criterion that all countries have the same expected payoff per person from 
the Treaty:  Ui/Li = Uk/Lk  for all i, k, where Li, Lk are countries' populations.  [3.16] 
The equity constraint [3.16] is met solely through adjusting targets {xi}, which we feel 
is politically more realistic than cash transfers, as assumed for example by Bohm and 
Carlén (2002).  Some constraint like [3.16] is needed to achieve a plausible 
differentiation of targets {xi} between countries under global payoff maximization with 
endogenous targets. With unconstrained maximisation, countries that are least affected 
by uncertainty and risk aversion would be allocated extremely tight targets (low xi’s), 
while highly risk-averse countries would get implausibly generous targets. The equity 
criterion [3.16] is necessarily arbitrary (just as any exogenously imposed scheme of 13 
target differentiation would be), but in sensitivity analysis in Section 4.5, the choice of 
equity criterion makes little difference to the relative merits of absolute and intensity 
targets.  What we will call the Reference Case, to which results for all other scenarios 
will be compared, is the outcome of applying [3.15] and [3.16] to emissions trading 
with absolute targets, and results for this are given in Section 4.1 below.   
As foreshadowed above, a target type that neutralises some of the uncertainty will give 
greater payoffs, and because criterion [3.16] does not specify a direct rule for target 
distribution, in turn this leads to tighter targets (a lower X), i.e. endogenous targets.  We thus 
model how better mechanism design improves environmental outcomes from a treaty.    Of 
the many proposed rules for, and subsequent analyses of, target differentiation or `burden 
sharing' in greenhouse gas control (see for example Rose et al. 1998 or Berk and den Elzen 
2001), most give exogenous targets. 
As a participation constraint, we demand only that each country's payoff under the treaty 
is greater than if there was no treaty at all (Ui > 0).  This quite weak constraint implicitly 
assumes that political cooperation can prevent free-riding (Eckersley 2004).  The MAGES 
model could be extended to non-cooperative situations and thus analyse free-riding 
incentives, but this is left for further work. 
3.4  Calibration of benefit and risk aversion parameters 
As already noted, endogenous target levels are a key policy feature of our model, 
and emerge from choosing targets to maximise the net benefits of a policy mechanism, 
rather than just choosing a mechanism to minimise the cost of achieving exogenously 
fixed levels.   But how should we calibrate the benefit valuation parameters {Vi} and 
{Wi}?   We chose not to use damage estimates as a proxy for each country's valuation of 
global abatement for three reasons: (a) damage estimates at the national level are highly 
speculative; (b) small differences in social discount rates translate to large differences in 
valuation because of the long time frames involved; and (c) high expected long-term 
damages from climate change in poorer countries do not necessarily translate to a 
correspondingly high willingness to pay for emission reductions now. 
Instead, we calibrated the valuation parameters {Vi} to conform with broad 
observations about the international debate about burden sharing, and this calibration is 
illustrative in nature. Relative per capita valuations {Vi/Li} are assumed to be a function 
of per capita income and historical responsibility for greenhouse emissions (cumulative 
emissions of energy CO2 from 1970 to 2000 per capita), with per capita income 
weighted twice as heavily. This yields much higher {Vi/Li} in rich countries, but 
roughly an even split in total valuation V between North and South.  Wi, the slope of the 14 
marginal benefit of GHG abatement curve, is chosen to be a small and constant share of 
Vi, resulting in a slight upward slope of the marginal benefit curve, in line with the well-
recognised notion that since most greenhouse gases are long-lived stock pollutants, the 
marginal damage curve is almost flat (Pizer 2002).   
In calibrating the risk aversion parameters {zi} and r in [3.13], we first choose all zi 
= 1/yi, with yi = Yi/Li, per capita GDP. The 1/yi factor matches the stylised fact that 
uncertainty matters more in poor countries, and thus captures an essential feature of the 
global climate policy debate.  The payoff concavity parameter r is then calibrated so 
that risk aversion results in significantly less stringent commitments under uncertainty, 
but without stifling agreement altogether.  In the default calibration, r is chosen so that 
global abatement in the Reference Case is one quarter lower than it would be without 
risk aversion. Overall global valuation parameters V and W, in conjunction with r, are 
chosen so that our Reference Case of a global climate treaty results in approximately a 
halving of global emissions growth between 2002 and 2020, compared to BAU. 
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4.  Performance of intensity targets 
How large are the potential improvements from intensity targets, and how important 
is optimal indexation? What are the key factors influencing the performance of intensity 
targets? This section explores these questions empirically through simulations using our 
model. We briefly describe the Reference Case, discuss aggregate and country-level 
results for the comparative performance of intensity targets, and then present alternative 
scenarios and sensitivity analysis. 
4.1 Reference  Case 
The Reference Case assumes that all countries participate in a cap-and-trade treaty 
with absolute targets (no indexation, all βi = 0), covering all major greenhouse gases. 
The Reference Case is a point of comparison for alternative scenarios with different 
types of intensity targets, not a prediction of a future climate treaty.  Table I shows a 
summary of reference case results for the North/South country groups. Country targets 
{xi} are shown in Table III below.  
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)   
Global abated emissions in the Reference Case, equal to the total amount of permits 
(E=X), grow by 15% from 2002 to 2020, compared to a projected 30% under BAU (E
b).  
This is equivalent to a reduction of 12% below global BAU emissions (x = 0.88), as 
shown in Table I. The Reference Case thus describes a significant but arguably realistic 
level of effort. The expected amount of abatement undertaken under the treaty is 6.5 
Gt/yr, which compares to expected abatement in the unilateral case of 0.9 Gt/yr, 
calculated using [3.8].
13  The expected permit price p from [3.11], equal to expected the 
marginal cost of abatement in all countries, is 15 $/t (of CO2-equivalent), well within 
the range of estimates of the marginal damage of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
literature (Tol 2005), and comparable to prices paid in 2005 for permits under the EU 
CO2 emissions trading scheme. Global dollar-valued global gain G from the climate 
treaty, defined as the expected sum of [3.12], is over 50 billion $/yr, translating into a 
somewhat lower payoff U after adjustment for risk aversion (from [3.14]). The expected 
global cost of abatement, C from summing [3.5], is well below 0.1% of projected global 
GDP, which reassures us that this is an acceptable application of a partial equilibrium 
model.  
                                                             
13 The magnitude of abatement in the unilateral case, where each region maximises their own expected 
benefit without regard to decisions by others, depends on the degree of aggregation. In a regionally more 
aggregated model, unilateral abatement would be larger, because each region captures a greater share of 
external (global) benefits of its abatement action.  16 
The emission targets {xi} used for the Reference Case are chosen to satisfy [3.15] 
and [3.16], that is to maximise expected global (risk-adjusted) payoff from a treaty 
subject to per capita payoff being equalised across all countries. Targets are strongly 
differentiated between countries, with stricter targets applying where relative valuation 
of abatement is higher, abatement is cheaper, and uncertainty or risk aversion lower.  
Table I shows that on the whole, high-income ‘Northern’ countries have relatively 
stringent targets and buy permits, while poorer countries abate their emissions below 
their targets and sell the freed-up permits, taking advantage of their relatively generous 
targets and relatively greater abatement options (for more detail, see left hand columns 
in Table III below). Compared to base year (2002) emissions, ‘Southern’ countries’ 
targets are above their current emissions, leaving room for future emissions growth. The 
South as a group would receive substantial permit revenue, almost offsetting their 
overall abatement cost. 
4.2  Exogenous intensity targets  
We model two types of intensity targets:  
-  standard intensity targets with one-to-one indexation to GDP for all countries i (βi  
= 1 as in [2.5]); and 
-  optimal intensity targets, where βi
*
 = αi/xi   for all i as in [2.10], so uncertainty due 
to fluctuations in GDP is fully neutralized. 
In a first set of scenarios, we hold targets Xi exogenously fixed at Reference Case 
levels, but allow for target indexation by setting all βi = 1 or αi/xi. This allows for an 
analysis of just the cost effectiveness of using indexation to achieve a given global 
abatement target under uncertainty. 
Global results are reported in Table II. Expected abatement is unchanged by virtue 
of holding target levels fixed. The expected global gain G increases by 5% and 7% 
respectively under standard and optimal intensity targets. This estimated improvement 
in expected gain under fixed target levels does not depend on our assumptions about 
risk aversion and payoff, but derives directly from reduced cost uncertainty. Increases in 
(risk-adjusted) expected payoff U from target indexation are substantially larger than in 
gain G, as they also take account of 'psychological' effects of a reduced risk of incurring 
losses under emissions trading. 
(TABLE II ABOUT HERE) 
Fixed, standard intensity targets do not necessarily lead increases in expected 
welfare in all countries. In some regions overcompensation under one-to-one indexation 17 
would in fact increase effective uncertainty relative to the Reference Case, as discussed 
in Section 4.4 below.  
4.3 Endogenous  intensity  targets 
We now allow the set of countries' target levels, {xi}, to be determined 
endogenously by maximizing global expected payoff subject to equal per capita 
distribution of expected payoffs. With intensity targets neutralising some or all of the 
GDP-related uncertainty, greater payoff can be achieved at a different set of maximising 
targets to those under absolute targets.  Our results show the degree to which this 
reduced uncertainty can achieve both tougher environmental commitments, i.e. lower X 
= ΣxiE
b
i (hence higher expected total abatement, Q = E
b–X), and higher payoff U. With 
endogenous intensity targets, expected global abatement increases by around one 
quarter (Table II, last two columns). Under optimal indexation, slightly larger 
improvements are possible than with standard intensity targets, because because not just 
target levels {xi} but also indexation levels {βi
*} are simultaneously free to vary (using 
[2.9] when maximising U in [3.15].  By contrast, the one-to-one indexation of standard 
intensity targets will on average over- or under-compensate for fluctuations in GDP. 
These quantitative estimates should be seen in the context of maximum improvement 
achievable if there was no uncertainty, which is one third, deriving from our choice of 
risk aversion parameter r (again see Table II).  
  Both expected gain and payoff are significantly greater under endogenous intensity 
targets, compared to the corresponding scenarios with exogenous targets. This is 
because in addition to part of their uncertainty being neutralized, countries are free to 
choose their levels of abatement (and then generally choose higher levels, closer to what 
would happen with no uncertainty). These results would hold also if not all countries 
take on intensity targets. Reduced uncertainty in one part of the world is transmitted 
between countries through less variability in the permit price, and in our modelling 
context, through greater overall abatement and payoff sharing.  
4.4  Targets and optimal indexation by country  
The globally averaged emissions target is respectively 2.8 and 3.2 percentage points 
more stringent under standard and optimal intensity targets than under absolute targets 
(Table III). For individual countries, the changes in endogenous targets vary greatly, 
here ranging from less than one to around ten percentage points.
14 This is because the 
                                                             
14 The move to a more flexible target type can lead to slightly less stringent targets (higher xi) in some 
countries/regions, contrary to more stringent commitments in aggregate. This is because reducing the cost 18 
degree to which intensity targets can help address uncertainty varies across countries.  
Neutralising activity-related emissions uncertainty brings the greatest advantage where 
the share of emissions linked with GDP (αi) is large, where uncertainty about future 
GDP (σYi) is large relative to other uncertainties, and where risk aversion (proxied by 
1/yi) is strong. In addition, larger countries tend to be affected more strongly by 
emissions uncertainty (and benefit from reducing uncertainty), as their domestic 
circumstances affect the global permit price.  
(TABLE III ABOUT HERE) 
For Southern (mainly developing) countries as a group, the impact of indexation on 
optimal target levels is greater than for Northern countries. In particular, moving from 
standard to optimal intensity targets brings little change for North’s targets overall, but 
rather more stringent targets in many Southern countries. So customising the degree of 
indexation plays a more important role in developing than in industrialized countries. 
This is because of systematic differences in the degree of emissions-GDP linkage αi and 
relative targets xi between countries, which enter the optimality condition βi
* = αi / xi in 
[2.9]. In many industrialised countries αi  takes on comparatively large values, because 
of the dominance of emissions from fossil fuel combustion (Australia and Canada/New 
Zealand being notable exceptions). At the same time, richer countries get allocated 
comparatively stringent targets, so xi are low. Together, this gives βi
* in the broad 
vicinity of one for many ‘Northern’ countries, so standard intensity targets with one-to-
one indexation would already do quite well.  
For several countries, the constrained-optimal target is lower than the share of 
emissions linked with GDP, so super-indexation of targets is optimal (xi < αi  means  
βi* > 1).  Under a reasonably ambitious treaty, this is likely to happen in many advanced 
economies, with Japan’s super-indexation of 1.3 being highest in our scenario. 
In most developing countries by contrast, partial indexation would be optimal. 
Countries with large non-energy sector emissions would generally be best off with very 
low degrees of indexation. This is evident for Indonesia and Brazil, where a large share 
of emissions stems from deforestation, the rate of which is unlikely to move with 
overall GDP. Here, optimal indexation would be very low, for a treaty that includes all 
greenhouse gas sources. Determining the optimal degree of indexation for each country 
in practice would require empirical assessments of emissions-GDP linkage at the sub-
sectoral level, and the sectoral coverage of an emissions target would be an important 
determinant of optimal indexation.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
of uncertainty has disproportionately large effects in some countries, and these gains are distributed 
across all countries under our equity rule [3.16], by way of adjusting target commitments. 19 
In some countries,  i i x α 2 > , so from [2.12] overcompensation under standard 
intensity targets would actually increase emissions uncertainty. If continuously 
differentiated indexation were not an option and each country only had the dichotomous 
choice between an absolute or a standard intensity target (βi = 0 or 1), then global payoff 
would be maximized if some developing countries had absolute, and the rest had 
standard intensity targets. In our scenario, absolute targets are preferable for Brazil, 
Indonesia, the Rest of the World region (all of which have large emissions from land-
use change) as well as – only just – Argentina and the South-East Asia region.
15 
Optimally indexed targets would of course be preferable in all countries.  
4.5  Sensitivity analysis  
Here we test the sensitivity of results to changes in some key parameters and 
assumptions from the baseline values used so far (as described in Section 3.4 and the 
Appendix), for the scenarios with endogenous intensity targets. Results are given in 
Table IV, with comments as follows.  
 
(TABLE IV ABOUT HERE) 
Equity criteria 
As foreshadowed earlier, our choice of equal per capita payoff as our standard 
equity criterion in [3.16] affects target levels and differentiation between countries, but 
makes little difference to the relative assessment of different types. For example, if the 
average global emissions reduction were applied uniformly to all countries (ie. xi = 0.88 
for all countries in the Reference Case, and likewise uniform percentage reductions 
under endogenous intensity targets), this would leave Southern countries with a much 
greater, and Northern countries with a much lesser, burden than in our Reference Case. 
Yet the increases in expected gain, payoff and global abatement from intensity targets 
differ only moderately from our baseline results.  
Uncertainty about GDP 
In further sensitivity analysis, the uncertainty parameter σYi is reduced and increased 
by one third, compared to the baseline calibration. Predictably, the less reliable 
projections of future GDP are, the greater is the potential role for intensity targets. Also, 
the gap between standard and optimal indexation increases in σYi. Greater uncertainty 
                                                             
15 By contrast, Sue Wing et al. (2006) found intensity targets preferable to absolute targets for all six 
developing countries they looked at. This is probably because they considered data for CO2 from fossil 
fuel combustion only, whereas we include all major greenhouse gas emissions and sources. 20 
about future GDP thus not only makes intensity targets more attractive, but also makes 
optimal indexation relatively more attractive, an outcome also found by Sue Wing et al. 
(2006) for the single-region case. 
Risk aversion  
If risk aversion is stronger than in our baseline calibration, the advantage of 
intensity targets is also greater; while if parties are less averse to the risk of losses, then 
designing mechanisms to mitigate risk is less important also. The greater the degree of 
risk aversion, the greater the increase in expected global abatement under endogenous 
targets – ranging from no or almost no change under risk neutrality, to much larger 
improvements than in our baseline results. Expected gain G and payoff U however are 
greater with intensity targets even under risk neutrality, as they are a function of net 
uncertainty at any given level of abatement.  
GDP–emissions linkage 
We first assume that only half (instead of all, as in the baseline) of energy sector 
emissions are linked with GDP, resulting in lower values for αi across the board.  
Standard intensity targets on the whole then perform slightly worse than absolute 
targets, because they strongly overcompensate for fluctuations in GDP.  Optimal 
intensity targets, at low levels of indexation, still improve the outcome compared to 
absolute targets.  If instead the overall emissions-GDP linkage is stronger than in the 
baseline, both standard and optimal intensity targets bring greater improvements over 
absolute targets.   
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5.  Drawbacks of target indexation 
Here we discuss the key downsides of intensity targets, and address arguments 
made against indexation in some of the relevant policy literature. 
5.1  Pro-cyclical effects and framing of uncertainty 
In the model we have assumed that the (risk-adjusted) payoff a country perceives 
from joining an emissions trading treaty is framed as a function of just the financial and 
environmental consequences of joining the treaty, not of any broader economic 
stabilisation. This would seem logical from the point of view of the treaty negotiators 
and industries that will be subject to emissions control, but from the point of the view of 
the country, should not the broader effect of overall economic uncertainty on welfare be 
taken into account?   
Which frame of reference to use for negotiation is a matter for political and 
psychological choice.  Given the existence of emissions trading, an absolute emissions 
target is not an absolute constraint on GDP growth, but a financial stabiliser. Intensity 
targets by contrast are pro-cyclical. However, our reading of the debate is that 
governments and negotiators are much more concerned about uncertainty within a treaty 
and their obligations under it. Potential impacts on domestic industries' competitiveness 
have played a strong role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, but arguments of overall 
economic stabilization were rarely heard. The value of permits would be small relative 
to the size of economies (in our calibration around 0.8% of global GDP), so changes in 
permit allocations would only amount to very small fractions of the changes in GDP 
that trigger them.   
5.2  Shifting uncertainty to emission levels 
Under intensity targets, the overall amount of emissions allowable under a treaty 
with intensity targets is not fixed, so uncertainty to some degree is shifted away from 
costs and on to emissions levels (Dudek and Golub 2003). We find that this is not an 
effective argument against target indexation in the greenhouse case, for several reasons. 
Firstly, we have shown that intensity targets can achieve both more stringent 
environmental commitments in expectation terms, and higher welfare. So higher 
variability in  X
~
, the amount of realised emissions allowed under the treaty, is 
outweighed in welfare terms by a lower level of X, the expected emissions. Under our 
simulation scenarios, there is a greater than 80% chance that global emissions  X
~
 under 22 
the treaty with optimal intensity targets are lower than under absolute targets, and actual 
abatement undertaken ( X E Q
b ~ ~ ~
− = ) is also greater in the majority of random 
realisations. And while intensity targets raise variability in total emissions, they actually 
lower variability in the amount of abatement. 
Secondly, uncertainty about overall emissions is created only insofar as fluctuations 
do not cancel out between countries, that is under a global economic boom or 
slowdown. A more typical pattern is for some countries to grow slower than expected 
while others grow faster, with offsetting effects.  
Finally, variability in emissions as a result of indexation of medium-term targets has 
a negligible effect on the existing, long-lived stock of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere.  For example, the global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is 
currently growing by about 2% per year, and fluctuations in emissions because of target 
indexation will amount to only a small share of this 2%.  So any temporary over- or 
undershooting of desired emissions at some point in time can be compensated for by 
periodically re-negotiating expected target levels. 
5.3  Complexity and window-dressing 
By bringing into play GDP as an additional variable for permit allocation, intensity 
targets make monitoring, verification and administration of the trading scheme more 
complicated, and there may be complications with using GDP measures as an activity 
index, especially with regard to inflation-proofing (Müller and Müller-Fürstenberger 
2003). Intensity targets would thus add extra administrative complexity to challenges 
such as distributional impacts and the risk of Dutch disease from selling permits, that 
any kind of emissions trading already poses for developing countries. Further, 
differentiating the degree of indexation would pose extra challenges for negotiations.  
There is also a danger that the very framing of targets in terms of intensity could be 
used to undermine the environmental stringency of commitments at a political level, in 
a highly charged and often poorly informed public debate. A reduction in future 
greenhouse intensity 'looks' more stringent than its equivalent expressed as a change in 
absolute emissions, because emissions intensity in most countries declines anyway, and  
this can be used for political window-dressing. For example, the Bush administration 
announced a goal of an 18% decline in US greenhouse emissions intensity from 2002 to 
2012. This is close to the expected business-as-usual path, and implies a substantial 
increase in emission levels, despite it being framed as a 'reduction' (in intensity). 
Window-dressing could be dealt with by presenting intensity targets in terms of their 
expected absolute emission levels with an adjustment term, as in [2.3].   23 
6. Conclusions 
Uncertainty about future paths of economic and emissions growth can be an 
important obstacle to effective emissions trading schemes, because of ex ante 
uncertainty about the cost of complying with emissions targets.  Intensity targets, where 
permit allocations are linked to future uncertain GDP, have been proposed as a means to 
reduce cost uncertainty by compensating for activity-related fluctuations in emissions.  
We have provided a theoretical analysis of emissions trading with endogenous intensity 
targets under GDP-linked and other uncertainties in emissions, applied it in a new 
multi-country, single-period, mainly partial equilibrium, empirical model of emissions 
trading and endogenous targets under uncertainty with risk aversion, and discussed the 
findings in a policy context.   
We have shown how, under which conditions, and by how much intensity targets 
could improve both participating countries' welfare and the environmental stringency of 
a 2020 cooperative climate treaty that covers all countries and the majority of 
greenhouse gases.  Standard intensity targets, which are indexed one-to-one to GDP, 
can reduce overall cost uncertainty and lead to better outcomes than Kyoto-Protocol-
style absolute targets, but they can systematically over- or undercompensate for GDP-
related fluctuations. Optimal intensity targets, where the degree of indexation is the 
ratio of the extent of each country's GDP-emissions linkage to its proportional target 
commitment, always perform better than absolute targets. In the scenarios simulated 
here, optimal intensity targets would result in increases in global abatement of more 
than a quarter, compared to absolute targets, with improvements in expected welfare to 
match.  
Optimal degrees of indexation would differ strongly between countries, with ‘super-
indexation’ optimal for many rich countries. For example, we find that Japan’s and 
Europe’s emissions targets would optimally rise or fall by about 1.3% and 1.1% 
respectively, if their GDPs turn out 1% higher or lower than expected. For developing 
countries by contrast, optimal indexation would typically be only partial, making it all 
the more important to tailor indexation to countries’ circumstances. In five out of our 18 
regions, an absolute target would even be preferable to one-to-one indexation, if a 
discrete choice had to be made; though optimal intensity targets always dominate. 
Potential improvements from indexation depend on how uncertain future GDP is, 
how strong future links between fluctuations in emissions and in GDP are, and how 
risk-averse decision-makers are in negotiating a treaty. Intensity targets have downsides, 
including their pro-cyclical effects in terms of the economy as a whole, their greater 
complexity and lesser transparency, and a small uncertainty about the level of emissions 24 
under the treaty. None of these potential drawbacks are likely to deal intensity targets a 
fatal blow however, and they need to be assessed against the important opportunity 
highlighted here, that greater flexibility could both strengthen environmental 
commitments and raise welfare.  A more complex, dynamical general equilibrium 
analysis of intensity targets seems unlikely to change this key conclusion. 
In the context of ongoing UN climate negotiations, intensity targets may be 
particularly interesting for middle-income, industrializing countries that consider 
joining a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. Further down the track they might be 
attractive for developing countries, and could even help make national-level emissions 
targets politically more palatable in the United States. Target indexation is unlikely to 
be sufficient by itself, though, to overcome deep-seated problems of cooperation, equity 
and politics that lie at the heart of the deadlock in global climate negotiations. Economic 
restructuring to achieve deep cuts in global greenhouse emissions will be costly, and 
rich countries will have to pay if it is to happen. Yet although flexible targets are no 
magic wand, in some cases they might just tip the political balance in favour of making 
environmental commitments.  
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 Appendix: Calibration of the MAGES model  
Emissions, GDP and population 
Data for the base year 2000 are from the World Resource Institute's CAIT database 
version 3.0 (WRI 2005), which compiles data from a range of sources.  In calibrating 
BAU emissions E
b
i we include carbon dioxide (CO2) from the energy sector 
(combustion of fossil fuels, plus emissions from cement production), CO2 from land-use 
change (mainly deforestation in tropical countries), and emissions of methane and 
nitrous oxide from a range of sources. Base data are for 2002 (CO2) and 2000 (other 
greenhouse gases). Projected growth rates until 2020 for BAU CO2 emissions from the 
energy sector are taken from projections by the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA 2004) and International Energy Agency (IEA 2004).  For non-energy GHG 
emissions, we use projections from US-EPA (2006). For land-use change we assume 
that annual emissions remain constant, in the absence of reliable projections. For GDP, 
we use purchasing power parity (PPP-) adjusted GDP in the year 2002 as the base data, 
and projections from EIA and IEA.  Population growth is from United Nations (2004) 
projections. Base data again are from CAIT.  All the resulting projections for 2020 are 
in Table A1. 
(TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE) 
Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves 
Abatement potentials Mi are calibrated for energy-derived CO2 on the basis of 
structural characteristics of each country.  The relationship between abatement potential, 
emissions intensity of electricity production, and the overall emissions intensity of the 
economy, is estimated using abatement cost estimates from computable general 
equilibrium models (Ellerman and Decaux 1998, Polidano et al. 2000).  This yields a 
consistent set of abatement potentials for our calibration, which is more regionally 
disaggregated than published MAC estimates (see also Jotzo 2006b).  For non-CO2 
emissions we derive relative abatement parameters from data cited by den Elzen and 
Lucas (2004); for land-use change, we assume that relative abatement potential is 
broadly in line with that for non-CO2 emissions. MAC schedules in the model are 
linear. Linearisation does not greatly change estimates of total costs compared to 
empirically estimated MAC functions with a typical degree of convexity, for the levels 
of abatement considered in this application.  26 
Uncertainties and the GDP-emissions link 
The empirical basis for calibrating uncertainty parameters σYi, σηi and σ ρi and the 
degree of GDP-emissions linkage αi is described in Section 2.1, and further detail can 
be found in Jotzo (2006a). The abatement cost uncertainty parameter σCi was estimated 
on the basis of the divergence between estimates for marginal abatement costs from ten 
models (Weyant 1999), and calibrated for p = 15 $/t as in our Reference Case. 
All uncertainty parameters σ  are scaled back by one third compared to the original 
empirical estimates, in order to reduce any risk of overstating the degree of effective 
uncertainty in the MAGES model. The distribution of error terms ε is truncated at two 
standard deviations above and below zero, in order to exclude unrealistic realisations at 
the extreme tails of the probability distributions. Errors are thus truncated in just under 
5% of individual realisations.   
The parameter αi (emissions linked with GDP) is set equal to the share of emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion and cement manufacturing in total emissions, projected for 
the year 2020.  
Valuation of emissions reductions 
See Section 3.4. 
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Tables 
Table I   Reference Case results  
 
Expected values of:    Global North South 
Target (permits) as share 
of BAU emissions  Xi/E
b
i = xi  0.88 0.79  0.93 
Permit price ($/t)  p  15.00 
Expected reduction 
commitment (Gt/yr)  E
b
i – Xi  6.46 3.89  2.57 
Expected abatement 
(Gt/yr)  Qi    6.46 1.39  5.07 
Expected permit exports 
(Gt/yr)  Qi – (E
b
i – Xi)  0  –2.50 2.50 
Expected gain from 
treaty (net of costs)  
(G$/yr)  Gi  56.5 7.2  49.4 
Expected (risk-adjusted) 
payoff from treaty 
(G$/yr)  Ui  47.6 6.8  40.8 
Expected costs from 
abatement (G$/yr)  Ci  57.3 12.3  44.9 
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Table II   Intensity targets: Global results  
Fixed exogenous targets  
(all xi as in Reference Case) 
Endogenous targets  

























(all βi*  = 
αi/xi*) 
Expected values of: 
Abatement Q 
(Gt/yr) 
8.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 8.0 8.2 
Gain G 
(billion $/yr) 
75.9 56.5 59.4 60.7 64.7 66.3 
Payoff U 
(billion $/yr) 
76.6 47.6 58.5 60.7 62.4 65.2 
Percentage difference compared to absolute targets: 
Abatement Q  33% -  0% 0%  24%  27% 
Gain G  34% -  5% 7%  14%  17% 




Table III    Intensity targets by country 
 
 
  Reference case  Endogenous intensity targets 
 

















GDP   
Country/region  
(N = North) 
Abated emis. 
relative to 








Target relative to BAU 
emissions (xi)  βi
* α i 
United States (N)  0.913  0.812  0.781  0.780  1.06  0.83 
Europe  (N)  0.933 0.748 0.727 0.727  1.13  0.82 
Japan  (N)  0.971 0.750 0.739 0.739  1.30  0.96 
Australia  (N)  0.874 0.810 0.796 0.795  0.81  0.65 
Canada/NZ  (N) 0.915 0.823 0.811 0.811  0.80  0.65 
Russia  0.836 0.801 0.773 0.773  1.01  0.78 
China  0.829 0.957 0.853 0.852  0.92  0.78 
India  0.853 0.947 0.936 0.936  0.65  0.61 
Brazil 0.876  0.904  0.897*  0.891  0.25  0.22 
Argentina 0.890  0.853  0.843*  0.843  0.45  0.38 
Mexico  0.884 0.832 0.819 0.819  0.79  0.65 
Korea  (S.)  0.923 0.815 0.801 0.800  1.16  0.93 
Indonesia 0.859  0.928  0.922*  0.914  0.21  0.19 
South-East Asia  0.876  0.899  0.891*  0.888  0.47  0.42 
South  Africa  0.861 0.810 0.796 0.795  1.12  0.89 
Northern  Africa  0.892 0.916 0.908 0.908  0.79  0.72 
Middle  East  0.875 0.914 0.895 0.895  0.79  0.71 
Rest of world  0.882  1.014  1.026*  1.004  0.34  0.34 
Aggregates: 
North  0.923 0.785 0.761 0.761  ..  0.55 
South  0.860 0.929 0.899 0.893  ..  0.64 
Global  0.881 0.881 0.853 0.849  ..  0.82 
 
*For these countries, the standard intensity target xi exceeds 2αi, and so reduces expected payoff compared to the 
Reference Case (see Section 4.4).30 
Table IV     Sensitivity analysis  
 
 
Change compared to 




Change to parameters 






Baseline -  27% 17% 
Uniform reduction commitments  Same xi for all countries  21% 16% 
Low GDP uncertainty  σYi reduced by one third  12% 6% 
High GDP uncertainty  σYi increased by one third  41% 34% 
No risk aversion  r = 0  0% 6% 
High risk aversion  r = 0.01 (baseline r = 0.085)  37% 26% 
Weaker GDP-emissions link  αi halved  4% 2% 




Table A1:  Baseline calibration of parameter values in the MAGES model  
Country/region 
(N) = ‘North’; the 


















































weight on risk 
averse part of 
payoff 
function 





equivalent) ..  G  t
2/yr.$ ..  ..  ..  ..  $/t  yr/$  yr/$  $/yr 
  Li Y i E
b
i  αi M i  σYi  σηi  σρi  σCi V i W i r  zi=1/(Yi/Li) 
United States (N)  0.337  16.47  8.63       0.83  0.0504  4.54 0.045  0.020 
†Europe (N)  0.568  17.99  6.23       0.82  0.0279  4.69 0.047  0.032 
Japan (N)  0.127  4.71  1.52       0.96  0.0029  1.18 0.012  0.027 
Australia (N)  0.024  0.87  0.66       0.65  0.0056  0.23 0.002  0.027 
Canada / NZ (N)  0.041  1.56  1.06       0.65  0.0060 
0.13 0.15 
0.43 0.004  0.026 
†Russia   0.186  2.88  3.15       0.78  0.0344  1.31 0.013  0.065 
China   1.415  15.67  8.73       0.78  0.0993  3.52 0.035  0.090 
India   1.332  6.67  3.00       0.61  0.0296  1.38 0.014  0.200 
Brazil   0.215  2.37  2.64       0.22  0.0217  0.50 0.005  0.091 
Argentina   0.044  0.73  0.49       0.38  0.0036  0.17 0.002  0.061 
Mexico   0.123  1.74  0.93       0.65  0.0073  0.40 0.004  0.071 
Korea (S.)  0.050  1.76  0.80       0.93  0.0041  0.39 0.004  0.028 
Indonesia   0.254  1.39  3.47       0.19  0.0329  0.29 0.003  0.183 
†South-East Asia   0.232  2.27  2.22       0.42  0.0183  0.48 0.005  0.102 
South Africa   0.048  0.90  0.66       0.89  0.0062  0.25 0.002  0.053 
†Northern Africa   0.190  1.19  0.75       0.72  0.0055  0.27 0.003  0.160 
†Middle East   0.280  1.83  2.44       0.71  0.0204  0.49 0.005  0.153 
†Rest of the 







North 1.10  41.6  18.1  0.82  0.093  0.13  0.15  0.20  11.06 0.111  0.026 
South 6.62  44.7  36.3  0.55  0.338  0.18  0.25  0.20  10.83 0.108  0.148 





† Europe includes Western and Eastern Europe (EU-28 countries plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Balkan states; Russia includes Ukraine and Belarus; South-East Asia includes 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (not Indonesia); Northern Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; Middle East includes 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; Rest of the World includes all other countries 
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